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During the 1977-78 term the Supreme Court heard and decided
eight cases that further refined the double jeopardy limitations on
government appeals in criminal cases.' The Court did not drasti-
cally alter traditional double jeopardy law in any one of these cases,
but its reappraisal of the underlying purposes of the double jeopardy
clause resulted in significant changes in some fundamental double
jeopardy areas. Since the double jeopardy clause2 is fully applicable
to state adult3 and juvenile4 justice systems, these decisions must be
examined for their impact on all American criminal jurisprudence.5
II.Historical Background and Underlying Policies
A. English Common Law
As early as Blackstone's day English courts considered it a "uni-
versal maxim" that "no man [was] to be brought into jeopardy of his
life more than once for the same offence." 6 The English criminal
defendant was afforded double jeopardy protection by three com-
1. See Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Greene
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Wheeler v. United
States, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
2. "INor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy for
life or limb .. " U.S. CONST. amend V.
3. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). The double jeopardy clause was first held applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
4. See Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-31
(1975).
5. Double jeopardy law can be divided very generally into the areas of defining the
same offense, see, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and determining the
permissibility of government appeals and retrials for the same offense. This comment focuses
exclusively on the latter category and examines the 1978 cases dealing with preverdict mistri-
als, dismissals, and acquittals.
6. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 335-36. The double jeopardy principle is much
older than Blackstone's day. It is one of the "oldest ideas in western civilization," traceable to
the early Greeks and Romans. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.3 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
mon-law pleas-autrefois convict, autrefois acquit, and pardon 7-that
embodies the same purpose as res j udicata and collateral estoppel do
in the civil justice system.' Since the only purpose of these common-
law pleas was to preserve the finality of a judgment, the defendant
could plead one of them only after a complete trial had culminated
in a final verdict.9
.B. The Ffth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause
1 The Underlying Interests. -Although the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause from its inception incorporated the English
res judicata function,' 0 the limited measure of protection afforded
the English defendant was rapidly expanded in the American crimi-
nal justice system." l Recognizing that "[tihere is a wide difference
between a verdict given and the jeopardy of a verdict,"'2I American
courts,"' by combining the English rule of jury practice forbidding
the needless discharge of juries' 4 with the existing res judicata pro-
tection, safe-guarded the defendant's double jeopardy right.' 5 By
the end of the nineteeth century, contrary to English law,' 6 a second
trial could offend the double jeopardy clause even if the first trial did
not end in a verdict.' 7 Justice Black succinctly stated the need for
preverdict double jeopardy protection as follows:
The underlying idea. . . is that the State with all its resources and
7. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978).
8. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
9. Id. The king could not appeal a final judgment on the merits but neither could the
defendant, at least not before 1700. See Miller, Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE
L.J. 486, 490-91 (1927). The defendant was similarly precluded from appealing a final judg-
ment in America until Congress made provision for appeal in certain cases in 1802. Even then,
appeal was possible only with the court's permission. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
88 (1978).
10. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
11. Id
12. Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 Serg. & Rawl. 557, 596 (Pa. 1822) (quoted in Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 34 n.10 (1978)).
13. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 62 Mich. 307, 29 N.W. 19 (1886); McDonald v. State, 79
Wis. 651, 48 N.W. 863 (1891).
14. Lord Coke said that once the "U]ury is retorned and sworn, their verdict must be
heard, and they cannot be discharged ...." 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 110 (6th ed. n.p. 1681). This rule only held in capital cases, and evidence that the rule
was not followed even in capital cases is abundant. See M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
12 (1969).
15. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33-35 (1978).
16. The English common-law followed then, as it does now, the rule that a defendant is
not in jeopardy until there has been an acquittal or conviction after a complete trial. Id at 33.
17. Id at 34..
If the judge can arbitrarily discharge and impanel juries until one is obtained that
will render such a verdict as the state demands, or the attorney for the prosecution
desires, and the only protection against such oppression is that a new trial may be
ordered in the court trying him, or by the court of last resort, then of what value is
this boasted right?
Id at 46 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 333, 339
(1873)).
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.'
8
Like his interest in preserving a judgment on the merits, the defend-
ant's interest in avoiding multiple prosecution has become "an inte-
gral part of [American] double jeopardy jurisprudence."' 9 The
evolution of the American criminal defendant's double jeopardy
protection did not cease with the identification of his interest in
avoiding successive burdensom prosecutions, however.
In 1949, in Wade v. Hunter,20 Justice Black spoke of the defend-
ant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribu-
nal.' Justice Black's words, in the context of Wade,22 were
probably intended as a rephrasing of the defendant's interest in
avoiding multiple prosecutions, 23 but the Supreme Court has seized
upon the terminology and given the defendant's "right" to the first
jury selected an identity independent of the other double jeopardy
interests.24 Thus, even before evidence is heard, the possibility that
the jury selected is favorably disposed to the defendant's fate merits
the protection of the double jeopardy clause.25
2. Double Jeopardy Interest Analysis. -While every defendant
has an absolute constitutional right to double jeopardy protection,26
no single double jeopardy interest conclusively outweighs the pub-
lic's competing interest in having one reasonable opportunity to try
those accused of violating its laws.27 Hence, in essence, all double
18. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
19. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 34 (1978).
20. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
21. Id at 689.
22. In Wade a defendant was court-martialed by a different tribunal than that originally
convened because the rapidly advancing German army had made it a logistical impossibility
to complete the first trial. In ruling retrial permissible the Court stated that "a defendant's
valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be
subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Id
23. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 47, 51 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
24. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
25. In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion), Justice Harlan
warned trial judges not to grant mistrials hastily, thereby foreclosing the defendant's chance
"of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict
of a tribunal he might believe favorably disposed to hisfate." (emphasis added).
26. "[Wjhere the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are
no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on
grounds which are not open to judicial examination." Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11
n.6 (1978). Compare United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975) with Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470 (1973).
27. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 n.7 (1978). As a general rule an appeal of
a judgment favorable to the accused will be permitted when retrial will not be necessitated by
a reversal of the trial judge's decision. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). Con-
versely, retrial of the defendant is permitted from a midtrial dismissal when there has been no
final judgment on the merits. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)).
jeopardy problems entail a weighing of the defendant's double jeop-
ardy interests, as they are implicated, against the public's interest.2"
This does not mean that trial or appellate judges must determine on
an ad hoc basis whether it would be fundamentally fair to allow a
retrial of the accused or an appeal by the government. 29 Rather,
lower courts are guided by the Supreme Court's categorical answers
to recurring double jeopardy problems. Those Supreme Court deci-
sions are best understood and most meaningfully analyzed in terms
of the double jeopardy interests involved.
III. Attachment
A. The Concept
In Serfass v. United States3" Chief Justice Burger pointed out
that
[a]s an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition of the
Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts have found
it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the
constitutional purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the
concept of "attachment of jeopardy."
31
It was only natural that American courts would designate attach-
ment at a much earlier stage of the proceedings than did their Eng-
lish ancestors because American courts had incorporated the English
rule forbidding jury discharge into a double jeopardy protection
prohibiting multiple prosecutions.32 Accordingly, most courts, 33 in-
cluding the Supreme Court,3 4 pinpointed the swearing of the jury as
the moment of attachment in a jury trial and the swearing of the first
witness as the moment of attachment in a bench trial.
B. Crist v. Bretz-The Federal Rule." A Constitutional Mandate
The legislature of Montana, seeing no need for a different rule
of attachment in bench and jury trials, statutorily provided that jeop-
ardy attaches in both when the first witness is sworn. 35 During the
1977-78 term the Supreme Court held that part of the Montana stat-
ute relating to jury trials unconstitutional in Crist v. Bretz. 36 To ar-
28. For an excellent exposition on double jeopardy interest analysis, see Comment,
Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals ofCriminal Dismissals, 52 TEX. L. REV. 303, 336-50
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Double Jeopardy].
29. See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975); note 26 supra.
30. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
31. ld at 388 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
32. See notes 12, 14, 17 supra.
33. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 210 Ala. 603, 98 So. 871 (1924); Scalf v. Commonwealth,
195 Ky. 830, 243 S.W. 1034 (1924).
34. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (citing Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963)).
35. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6808(3) (1947).
36. 437 U.S. 28 (1978). In Crist the proceeding was terminated, at the prosecution's re-
quest, because a typographical error would have precluded conviction on the information.
rive at its conclusion, the Crist Court37 reasoned that the federal rule
of attachment both "reflects and protects" the defendant's interest in
retaining a chosen jury.38 Finding that interest to be deeply rooted
in the American criminal justice system,39 the Court asserted that the
federal attachment rule the interest embodies is "an integral part" of
the defendant's double jeopardy protection, the "lynchpin for all
double jeopardy jurisprudence," and, therefore, a constitutional
mandate.'
The Court's opinion, however, does not persuasively support its
conclusion because the Montana rule is nowhere distinguished from
the federal rule.4' If, as the Court insisted, the interest in retaining a
chosen jury is the determining factor in the attachment rule, jeop-
ardy should attach when jury selection begins or at least when selec-
tion is completed.42 Clearly, the Montana rule is not distinguishable
from the federal rule on this basis.4 3 The other double jeopardy in-
terests, mentioned perfunctorily by the Court,' provide no basis for
differentiation either. Anxieties and burdens of trial are not signifi-
cant enough at the time the jury is sworn to compel the federal
rule,4" and only Justice Blackmun, who concurred with the majority,
emphasized this double jeopardy interest.46 The defendant's interest
in preserving a final judgment is not implicated until a verdict is
given47 and is unaffected by either rule. Moreover, the Court no-
where explained why the rules regarding attachment should be dif-
ferent in the jury and the bench trial, as they continue to be in
federal law.48
The State did not press its claim at the Supreme Court level that the termination was a "mani-
fest necessity." Id at 31 n.5. For a discussion of the manifest necessity standard, see notes 58-
63 and accompanying text infra.
37. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in a 6-3 decision.
38. 437 U.S. at 38.
39. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
40. 437 U.S. at 38.
41. See 437 U.S. at 51 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. 437 U.S. at 38 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 512-14 (1977)).
43. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 50-51 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
concluded that the due process clause would protect the Montana defendant from
prosecutorial overreaching prior to the time the first witness is sworn, just as it must protect the
federal defendant prior to the time the jury is sworn. Id The Montana Supreme Court, up-
holding the same Montana statute in a companion case to Crist, stressed that the trial judge
has the inherent power to dismiss the prosecution with prejudice if he suspects prosecutorial
manipulation. State v. Cunningham, 166 Mont. 530, -, 535 P.2d 186, 189 (1975).
44. The majority opinion mentioned the need to minimize the "harassing exposure to the
harrowing experience of a criminal trial" and the need to preserve a final judgment as policies
underlying the federal rule of attachment, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978), but stressed
only the interest in the chosen jury. Id at 38 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. Pretrial motions also require expenditures of time, energies, and resources, but jeop-
ardy does not attach at the making of those motions. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 49-51 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975)).
46. Id at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
48. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 49 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The federal rule of attachment is the end product of the Court's
balancing of the defendant's and the public's interests to determine
at what point in a criminal proceeding the defendant's double jeop-
ardy interests are significantly implicated.49 The Montana legislature
also balanced the relevant interests and came to a different, but not
unreasonable, conclusion.5" Since the Crist Court imposed a hard
and fast rule in an area of double jeopardy law in which policy con-
siderations might logically lead a different sovereign to another con-
clusion,5' the case has implications for federalism, as well as double
jeopardy jurisprudence.
No doubt a line would eventually have to be drawn to safeguard
adequately the defendant's double jeopardy interests, but that line
should not necessarily be drawn at the point representing what the
Supreme Court considers the most reasonable resolution of the com-
peting interests.52 The majority's constitutional enshrinement of the
federal rule in view of its inability or unwillingness to distinguish the
Montana rule lead Chief Justice Burger to warn,
We should be cautious about constitutionalizing every procedural
device found useful in federal courts, thereby foreclosing the State
from experimentation with different approaches which are equally
compatible with constitutional principles. All things "good" or
"desirable" are not mandated by the Constitution. . . . Principles
of federalism should not so readily be compromised for the sake
of a uniformity finding sustenance perhaps in considerations of
convenience by certainly not in the Constitution. . . . The
Court's holding. . . continues .. the business of trivializing the
Constitution on matters better left to the States.53
Apart from its federalistic overtones, the Crist decision is a sig-
nificant one in the evolution of American double jeopardy jurispru-
dence, for it evidences that the "right" to retain a chosen jury has
outgrown its common-law origins and has attained a vitality of its
49. Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). Ideally,
a rule of attachment should
isolate the moment when the defendant first occupies a procedural position that ex-
poses him to substantial risk of conviction. To delay attachment until later in the trial
would increase the risk of harassment and allow the prosecution to escape an unfa-
vorable jury. To begin earlier would injure the Government's interest in bringing a
defendant to trial in return for the accused's insignificant advantage of protection
from repeated indictment.
Comment, Double Jeopardy, supra note 28, at 337 (emphasis added).
50. Montana drafted its statute after the Model Penal Code, in which the American Law
Institute concluded that no valid rationale exists for having jeopardy attach earlier in the jury
trial than in the bench trial. State v. Cunningham, 166 Mont. 530, -, 535 P.2d 186, 187 (1975)
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)).
51. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also United
States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
52. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Court concluded that a six person jury
was permissible even though the federal rule requires twelve jurors); Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223 (1978) (despite a plurality opinion, all of the Justices thought that the accused's con-
stitutional rights would be violated by a five member jury).
53. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
own. No other interest justifies, let alone mandates, a rule of attach-
ment before evidence is introduced and conviction becomes a risk.
54
Clearly, the Court considers the scope of the double jeopardy clause
broad enough to include not only the defendant who has been ac-
quitted, but also the one who has chosen a jury that might be favora-
bly disposed to his fate.
Attachment merely begins the double jeopardy inquiry. 55 For
those states that would give the public's interest greater weight in the
balance, the 1978 Court has mitigated the apparent rigidity of the
Crist decision by reaffirming prior decisions holding that mistrials
properly declared after jeopardy attaches do not bar a second trial
56
and holding for the first time that certain dismissals declared after
jeopardy attaches are appealable. 7
IV. Mistrials
Before the impact of the Court's recent double jeopardy deci-
sions in the area of mistrials can be analyzed, a review of some prior
decisions is appropriate.
A. The Manifest Necessity Standard
After jeopardy attaches the defendant has protected interests in
having the jury impanelled determine his fate and in avoiding the
rigors of a second proceeding. 8 Absent a final judgment favorable
to the accused,59 however, these interests may be subordinated to the
public's interest in onefair opportunity to convict the defendant.
60
Thus, as Justice Story explained in 1824, the trial judge is authorized
to declare a mistrial if "there is manifest necessity for the act, or the
ends of justice would otherwise be defeated."'" The manifest neces-
sity standard governs the propriety of a mistrial declaration today,62
but the meaning of "manifest necessity" has changed many times
over the years.63
54. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 PA. L. REV. 449, 502-03 (1977).
55. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 (1975).
56. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
57. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See note 146 and accompanying text infra.
58. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04. See notes 10-24 and accompanying
text supra.
59. See note 27 supra.
60. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
61. Perez v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). For a thorough analysis of
the various interpretations of Justice Story's classic formulation, see Comment, Double Jeop-
ardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial" Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manfestly Necessary?, 69
N.W.U. L. REV. 887, 893-94 (1975).
62. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
63. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 458-71.
B. Appellate Review of the Mistrial Decision
1. The DeferentialApproach and Gori -Early appellate courts
displayed extreme deference to trial court discretion to grant mistri-
als.64 The Supreme Court in Gori v. United States65 established a
standard for review of mistrial decisions, but the standard provided
the defendant inadequate protection from overzealous prosecutors
and ill-considered mistrial declarations. 66  In Gori a mistrial de-
clared prematurely, over the defendant's objection was upheld be-
cause the appellate court discerned from the record that the trial
judge had acted solely for the benefit of the defendant.67 Although
the decision was justifiable on the facts of Gori,68 the test for mani-
fest necessity derived from the Court's rationale had some obvious
shortcomings. 69 The subjective motivation of the trial judge is not
easily ascertained from a trial court record, and the defendant's in-
terest in having to convince only one factfinder of his innocence is
violated regardless of the judge's intentions.7" More importantly,
however, it is difficult to justify a mistrial declaration as having been
for the defendant's benefit when he expressly objected at the time.
Given these shortcomings, it is not surprising that Gori and its prog-
eny soon gave way to a stricter standard of appellate review.
2. The Need for Alternative Consideration-Jorn.-In United
States v. Jorn7 the Court denied retrial of a defendant after a trial
judge had declared a mistrial sua sponte because he could not be
convinced that five prosecution witnesses were aware of their privi-
leges against self-incrimination.72 Writing for a plurality of the
64. See, e.g., United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584
(1941).
65. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
66. See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 461.
67. 367 U.S. at 369.
68. The judge apparently declared the mistrial because he was genuinely concerned that
the prosecutor's line of questioning was about to prejudice the defendant's chances for acquit-
tal by touching on other offenses he had committed. Id. at 366.
69. Ironically, the test to be used and its inadequacies were stated in the same paragraph
thus:
Judicial wisdom counsels against anticipating hypothetical situations in which the
discretion of the trial judge may be abused and so call for the safeguard of the Fifth
Amendment--cases in which the defendant would be harassed by successive, oppres-
sive prosecutions, or in which a judge exercises his authority to help the prosecution
at a trial in which its case is going badly, by affording it another, more favorable
opportunity to convict the accused. Suffice that we are unwilling, where it clearly
appears that a mistrial has been granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to hold
that its necessary consequence is to bar all retrial.
Id (emphasis added).
70. Comment, Double Jeopardy, supra note 28, at 326.
71. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
72. Id at 473 (plurality opinion).
Court, Justice Harlan73 stressed the inadequacy of tests that focus
either on the source of the problem74 or the intended beneficiary of
the ruling.75 He resolved that even in the absence of prosecutorial
manipulation the double jeopardy clause protects the defendant's in-
terest in a fact finder he considers predisposed to his fate.76 Thus,
absent the defendant's consent,7 7 the judge should not foreclose the
defendant's option to have a verdict rendered "until a scrupulous
exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of
justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings."78
Finding no evidence of consideration of alternatives to a mistrial
declaration in the record,7 9 the plurality prohibited retrial.8"
3. Somverville and Defective Indictments. -Jorn's emphasis on
alternatives has merited the accolade of courts8' and commentators
alike,82 but Jorn cannot aid the trial judge in a case in which state
law precludes any remedy other than a mistrial. Facing this issue
two years after Jorn, in Illinois v. Somerville,83 the Court upheld a
trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial because the information
against the defendant contained a defect unamendable under state
law and nonwaiveable by the defendant.84 Finding little opportunity
73. Justice Harlan was joined by three others, including Chief Justice Burger, who sepa-
rately concurred in both the opinion and the judgment. Id at 487-88.
74. This reference was to Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), decided two
years after Gori. In Downum the Court prohibited retrial after a mistrial had been declared at
the request of the prosecutor, who could not locate key witnesses for two of the eight counts
joined for trial. The Court stressed that the prosecutor, whose unpreparedness caused the trial
difficulty, should not be rewarded with a second, more favorable opportunity to convict the
accused. Id at 738 n. I and accompanying text. But see notes 83-87 and accompanying text
infra.In this regard, it has also been said that tle double jeopardy clause "unquestionably 'for-
bids the prosecutor to use the first proceeding as a trial run of his case.'" Arizona v. Washing-
ton, 434 U.S. 497, 508 n.24 (1978) (quoting Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 287-88
(1965)).
75. 400 U.S. at 486.
76. Id See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
77. See United States v. Dintz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), discussed at notes 115-32 and accom-
panying text infra, for the implications of the defendant's consent to a mistrial.
78. 400 U.S. at 485.
79. The trial judge had acted so abruptly that, "had the prosecutor been disposed to
suggest a continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have
been no opportunity to do so." Id at 487.
80. Justices Black and Brennan believed that the Court lacked jurisdiction of the appeal
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) (amended 1970) because the trial judge's action amounted to an
acquittal, but joined in the Court's judgment because a majority of the Court decided to reach
the merits. Id at 488.
81. The circuit courts of appeals have emphasized the need for explicit evidence on the
record of the trial judge's search for alternatives more than the Supreme Court has emphasized
that need. Compare Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 434 U.S. 497
(1978) with Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1978).
82. See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 466; Note, Misirials and Double Jeopardy, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 943-45 (1974).
83. 420 U.S. 458 (1973).
84. Id at 460. The rule that made the defect unamendable implemented a policy of the
State that any prosecution against the defendant be commenced by a grand jury proceeding.
Id at 468.
for prosecutorial manipulation in the Somerville situation,85 the
Court deemed it unnecessary to require the state to continue present-
ing evidence in an effort to gain a conviction that could not with-
stand appeal.86 Even though an impartial verdict would have been
rendered, the Court maintained that the "demand for public justice"
justified the mistrial declaration over the defendant's objection.87
Normally, the public interest that is weighed in the balances of
necessity is that of "one complete opportunity to convict those who
have violated its laws."88 The Somerville, decision is troublesome,
however, because the Court spoke only of wasted state resources. 89
Good reason exists to terminate a trial without the defendant's con-
sent when highly prejudicial remarks or other circumstances have
made a conviction unlikely, because jury acquittal absolutely pre-
cludes governmental appeal.9" Wasted state resources, on the other-
hand, should not justify a mistrial declaration when a fair verdict is
still possible, and the government, rather than the defendant, care-
lessly necessitates the second proceeding, which will be required to
gain a valid conviction. Requiring the state to pay monetarily for its
errors is not only an appropriate sanction but also one likely to gen-
erate other state-imposed deterrences to carelessness as well.9 ' More
importantly, the defendant will retain the benefit of the first jury im-
panelled.
4. Arizona v. Washington-Strict Scrutiny or Judicial Defer-
ence.-The Court decided Gor4 Jorn, and Somerville on their own
merits, making little attempt to formulate guidelines for the lower
courts to follow.92 Two of the Court's recent decisions, however,
provide a more suitable framework for appellate court analysis of
the mistrial dilemma.93
85. Id at 469. Justice White disagreed, noting that it is quite probable for a state to gain
a conviction in spite of a defect in the indictment and that the conviction will stand unless and
until the defect comes to light. 410 U.S. 458, 476 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). Because the
prosecutor in Somerville caused the trial difficulty and also requested the mistrial, it is quite
possible that the case would be decided differently today. See notes 101-03 and accompanying
text infra.
86. 410 U.S. at 469.
87. Id at 471.
88. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978).
89. 420 U.S. at 469. The Court spoke of wasted "time, energy, and money for all con-
cerned." Id (emphasis added). Since the defendant would, in effect, be getting a risk-free
chance for acquittal, it is unlikely that he would complain of the cost.
90. "A judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling
by the Court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates
the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal." United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
91. See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 508 n.243.
92. The Court declared in Somerville that mistrial problems defy categorization. Illinois
v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973).
93. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v. Dintz, 424 U.S. 600
(1976), discussed in notes 115-32 and accompanying text infra.
(a) The first level of inquiry-selection of the standard of re-
view.-In Arizona v. Washington,94 decided during the 1977-78 term,
the Court reviewed a mistrial that had been granted at the prosecu-
tor's request in response to prejudicial remarks made by defense
counsel.9" The case occasioned a rational exposition of the criteria to
be used to determine manifest necessity in any mistrial situation.
Setting forth the proper mode of inquiry, Justice Stevens9 6 asserted
that the term "necessity" is not to be taken literally.97 Rather, the
Court assumes that there are degrees of necessity and that Justice
Story's98 formulation contemplates necessity of a "high degree."9 9
Furthermore, Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court will find the
required necessity more easily in some kinds of cases than in
others."° Mistrial situations that lend themselves to prosecutorial
manipulation will be viewed with strictest scrutiny, and necessity for
mistrial will be found infrequently.'' At the other extreme the
Court will defer to the trial judge's discretion when he grants a mis-
trial because the jury cannot reach a verdict, and a second trial will
normally be permitted.
0 2
Although Justice Stevens did not expressly identify the relevant
factors to be utilized in determining whether a problem is one sus-
ceptible to prosecutorial manipulation yielding strict scrutiny, both
the source and the nature of the difficulty should be the primary con-
siderations.0 3 Determination of the appropriate standard of re-
94. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
95. Id at 498.
96. Four Justices joined in his opinion, Justice Blackmun concurring in the result.
97. 434 U.S. at 506.
98. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
99. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).
100. Id Justice Stevens spoke only of "strictest scrutiny" and "great deference" when
speaking of the degrees of appellate scrutiny. His reference to these as the "extremes" and his
assertion that there is "a spectrum of trial problems which may ... vary in their amenability
to appellate scrutiny" suggest a sliding scale approach. See id at 509, 510 (emphasis added).
This line of analysis, however, is not pursued herein.
101. Id. at 508. The American courts have made painstaking efforts to abolish the "ab-
horrent," ancient English practice of the judges' granting mistrials to buttress weak prosecu-
tion cases. Id at 508 n.24.
See also McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951
(1974) (assertion of privilege against self-incrimination by prosecutor's key witness no justifica-
tion for mistrial).
102. Justice Stevens buttressed his conclusion that the judge's declaration of a mistrial in
cases of a "hung jury" demanded deference by examining the practical implications of a
stricter scrutiny. He hypothesized,
If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate court views the "neces-
sity" for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a danger that the
latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling would
employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule would frustrate
the public interest in just judgments.
Id at 509-10 (footnotes omitted). For a different opinion of the degree of appellate scrutiny
needed in the "hung jury" mistrial, see Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 523.
103. If the prosecutor is the direct source of the problem that results in the mistrial, e.g., he
or she makes highly prejudicial statements during the trial, "strict scrutiny" is certainly appro-
priate. The Washington case presents a situation in which the mistrial request by the prosecu-
view--strictest scrutiny or judicial deference--only begins the
appellate inquiry, however.
(b) The second level of inquiry-examination of the
facts.-Justice Stevens explained that the Court must also evaluate
the facts of the case being reviewed, under the standard selected, to
determine whether the "high degree" of necessity required in every
case existed. 'I While truly extraordinary circumstances would have
to exist at trial to make a mistrial a manifest necessity in "strict scru-
tiny" situations,0 5 a mistrial declaration will be upheld whenever
the judge has exercised "sound discretion" if the Court determines
initially that the matter was one better left to the trial judge's discre-
tion. 
0 6
Though not explicitly mentioned by Justice Stevens, individual
case factors relevant to this second level of inquiry might properly
include the following: (1) the stage of the trial when the mistrial was
granted;0 7 (2) the defendant's prospects for acquittal at the time; (3)
the number of plausible alternatives to the mistrial; (4) evidence of
proper consideration of the alternatives, and (5) the length of time
tion was a response to prejudicial remarks by the defense counsel, and the Court quite
properly found the deferential standard applicable. See notes 108, 109, and 110 infra.
Problems not directly attributable to either side might nevertheless be thought to be within the
control of the prosecution. Here too there is a danger of manipulation, and a "strict scrutiny"
standard of review would be required. The unavailability of key prosecution witnesses should
certainly fall within this category. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); see also
McNeal v. Hollowel, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (mistrial
declared after prosecution's principal witness unexpectedly claimed privilege against self-in-
crimination held improper).
A great number of recurring problems, however, are not directly or indirectly attributable
to the prosecution or defense. An obvious example is that of juror bias arising from circum-
stances beyond the parties' control. See, e.g., United States v. Walden, 448 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.
1971), modified, 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972) (juror returned to
courtroom after jury had been excused and observed the defendant in handcuffs). A deferen-
tial standard of review might be considered appropriate in these situations since the nature of
the events precludes prosecutorial inducement for tactical manipulation. Nevertheless, the
possibility that the trial judge may be influenced by the prosecution's prospect for securing a
conviction in the trial in choosing among possible alternatives may require the appellate courts
to review mistrials declared in these circumstances with "strict scrutiny." See Schulhofer,
supra note 54, at 509. Therefore, the number of viable alternatives to a given problem and
recorded evidence of the trial judge's proper consideration of those alternatives might properly
dictate the standard of review for a mistrial that results from trial problems in this category.
104. 434 U.S. at 514.
105. The opinion did not address the issue of whether a mistrial could ever be considered
manifestly necessary in an area demanding strict scrutiny. The death of a key prosecution
witness after trial has begun, however, might justify termination of a first trial and a retrial of
the defendant. Likewise, if the prosecutor proves that he is unable to produce witnesses or
evidence because of purposeful misconduct of the defense, a mistrial might be justified. Cf
Baker v. State, 15 Md. App. 73, 289 A.2d 348 (1972), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973) (mistrial
properly declared after witness admitted accepting money for testifying in favor of accused).
106. 434 U.S. at 514.
107. Like the Washington Court, Schulhofer formulated a strict necessity stan-
dard-flexible standard dichotomy for appellate review, but his approach turned on the stage
to which the trial had progressed prior to mistrial, rather than susceptibility of the situation to
manipulation. See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 511-19.
between the occurrence of the difficulty and the mistrial declaration.
Some of these factors may often be proper considerations at the first
level of review as well.
The Court demonstrated this model of mistrial decision analysis
by applying it to the facts in Washington and concluded on the basis
of "compelling institutional reasons, '  practical necessity,1°9 and
prior decisions"o that the possibility of jury bias created by defense
counsel's prejudicial remarks justified a deferential standard of re-
view of the mistrial declaration."' Scrutinizing the trial court record
the Court determined that the trial judge had acted responsibly, ac-
cording careful consideration to the defendant's interest in having
the trial concluded in a single proceeding." 2 Under this deferential
standard of review, neither the trial judge's failure to canvass alter-
natives on the record nor the probability that other courts would
have remedied the remark with a jury instruction could persuade the
Court that the mistrial was improvidently granted.' 13 Upholding the
judge's decision, the Court permitted retrial of the defendant.
The Washington solution to mistrial review hinges on the stan-
dard of appellate scrutiny selected, since this first level of inquiry
will usually be outcome-determinative. Therefore, the appellate de-
cisions will continue to be contradictory and confusing if the appel-
late courts do not agree on which problems demand strict scrutiny."
4
Initially, complete agreement is not likely, but the problem will be
remedied after the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to address
the more troublesome areas. Although Washington is the only first
step, the case provides a solid foundation for future uniformity and
predictability.
5. Mistrials Granted with Defendant's Consent; No Double Jeop-
ardy Violation-Dintz. -Traditionally, the Supreme Court had as-
sumed that the defendant's consent to, or request for, a mistrial
108. The Court pointed out that bias is difficult to assess from a trial record and is better
left to the trial judge, who is more conversant with the relevant factors. 437 U.S. at 514.
109. That the defense counsel introduced the prejudicial error was crucial to the Court's
determination. "Unless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage,
the trial judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases." Id at 513.
110. Id at 512 (citing Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Simmons v.
United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891)).
111. Id at 510-11. The Court distinguished the Washington case, in which the whole
panel may have been influenced, from the situation in which one juror may have been affected,
intimating that a different standard of review would be appropriate in the latter situation be-
cause more remedial alternatives would be available. Id. at 512 n.31.
112. 434 U.S. at 516.
113. Id at 511, 516-17. The court of appeals in Washington had been persuaded by these
considerations. Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 434 U.S. 497
(1978). See note 81 supra.
1 14. That disagreement is likely is evidenced by Schulhofer's determination that a mistrial
declared because of a "hung jury" demands strict scrutiny, a conclusion directly at odds with
the Washington Court. See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 523.
removed all barriers to reprosecution, absent prosecutorial or judi-
cial overreaching."' In a 1976 case, United States P. Dintz," 6 the
Court, responding to an appellate court's misunderstanding of the
underlying principles, reexamined and forcefully reasserted the va-
lidity of that assumption. In Dintz the trial judge had "overreacted"
to defense counsel Wagner's improper opening statement by expel-
ling him from the courtroom and excluding him from the trial.
117
After another of the defendant's attorneys, Meldon, indicated that
the defendant did not want to continue with Meldon representing
him, the judge presented him with three alternatives: (1) a stay to
gain appellate review of the propriety of expelling Wagner; (2) con-
tinuation of the trial without Wagner; or (3) a mistrial to allow the
defendant to obtain counsel." 8 "Full consideration" of the alterna-
tives led the defendant to opt for the mistrial. " 9 After the defendant
was retried and convicted the court of appeals held that the defend-
ant had not voluntarily waived his double jeopardy protection in the
first proceeding, that the manifest necessity standard had not been
met, and therefore, that the second trial violated the provisions of the
double jeopardy clause. 1
20
The Supreme Court, rejecting the court of appeals' waiver anal-
ysis, reversed that court's decision and reinstated the defendant's
conviction. '2' The decision was predicated on the Court's belief that
a defendant's request for a mistrial is not analogous to a waiver of a
constitutional right; the defendant has an interest in the first jury, not
an absolute right.122 The defendant's request for a mistrial reflects
his belief that prejudicial error has made his prospect for acquittal so
unlikely that continuation is futile. 123 Under the court of appeals
115. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971).
116. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
117. Justice Stewart, writing for himself and five others, accepted the appellate court's
conclusion on the impropriety of the judge's action. Id at 611.
118. Id at 604.
119. Attorney Meldon relayed the defendant's decision regarding the mistrial to the trial
judge. The important interest in the first jury is the defendant's, but the attorney will, in all
likelihood, have the greater understanding of the tactical and practical consequences of contin-
uing a prejudicially marred trial.
120. See United States v. Dintz, 492 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1974)
(en banc), rev'd, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
121. 424 U.S. at 611.
122. The circuit court of appeals had depicted the trial judge as presenting the defendant
with something of a "Hobson's choice." 492 F.2d at 59. The Court did not question its find-
ing, but clearly indicated that the traiditional waiver analysis has little relevance in the mistrial
context.
[The waiver approach] erroneously treats the defendant's interest in going forward
before the first jury as a constitutional right comparable to the right to counsel. It
fails to recognize that the protection against the burden of multiple prosecutions un-
derlying the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy may be served by a
mistrial declaration and the concomitant relinquishment of the opportunity to obtain
a verdict from the first jury.
424 U.S. at 609 n.l 1. See also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467 (1964).
123. 424 U.S. at 610.
holding the trial judge would be instructed to reject even meritorious
requests, which would only undermine the purposes of the double
jeopardy clause by requiring the defendant to undergo the burdens
and anxieties of a prosecution he has no desire to continue.' 24 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that when the defendant is given primary
control over the course to be followed in the event of error, the
double jeopardy clause is not violated.
125
The Court, however, forcefully reiterated that
[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against
government actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and
thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed
by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where "badfaith conduct
by judge or prosecutor" threatens the "harassment of an accused
or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant.
26
Clearly, for a defendant to prevail on his claim that retrial should be
prohibited after a mistrial has been declared at his request, he must
prove that the prosecution or judge, in bad faith, intended to pro-
voke that request. Nevertheless, some courts of appeal continue to
prohibit a retrial in situations in which they find no evidence of in-
tentional misconduct,1 27 even though these holdings are plainly in-
consistent with Dintz.
Undoubtedly, the prosecutor's actions should be closely scruti-
nized whenever they precipitate a mistrial granted at the defendant's
request.' 28 Retrial should not be barred, however, whenever negli-
gence or "gross negligence" is found. The better approach is to aid
the defendant with his difficult burden of proving bad faith intent by
124. Normally, before the jury verdict, the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of
multiple trials and his interest in the chosen jury reinforce one another because a mistrial
declaration and subsequent retrial will violate both. After error has been introduced into the
trial, however, the interest in the first jury conflicts with the interest of avoiding the harrowing
trial experience.
125. 424 U.S. at 609.
126. Id at 611 (emphasis added).
127. The 1977 case of United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977) is a good
example. Martin was accused of making a false oath and fraudulently concealing assets in a
bankruptcy proceeding. His request to have his grand jury testimony excluded from the trial
was denied, but the judge cautioned the Government not to read prejudicial and irrelevant
portions of the transcript. Early in the trial, after prejudicial portions had been read, the trial
judge granted Martin's request for a mistrial. Finding the prosecution's actions in the first
proceeding merely negligent, the district court denied Martin's request for a dismissal and
subjected him to a second trial in which he was convicted. Id at 138. The court of appeals
reversed the conviction and dismissed the defendant. Finding no conclusive evidence of inten-
tional governmental misconduct, the court concluded, "If the government's actions in reading
this irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony to the jury were not intentionally designed to
provoke a mistrial request, at a minimum they constitute gross negligence." Id at 140.
This decision is clearly inconsistent with Diniz, particularly because Martin had not even
alleged intentional or bad faith prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. See id at 139. Martin,
like the defendant in Dintz, was given primary control over the trial proceeding. He chose a
mistrial, and a retrial would have been proper.
128. If prosecutorial misconduct results in a sua sponte mistrial declaration, the court of
appeals will review the decision with strict scrutiny and retrial will generally be prohibited.
See notes 10 1 -03 and accompanying text supra.
drawing inferences of intent from the objective circumstances of the
trial court proceeding. For example, if the trial was going badly for
the prosecution prior to the impropriety, an inference of intent
should be drawn. Likewise, if a second trial has occurred prior to
appellate review and the prosecutor's evidence was noticeably more
favorable in the second proceeding than it had been in the first, an
inference of bad faith would be justified. 29 Furthermore, if the trial
judge perceives intentional misconduct he should dismiss the de-
fendant outright under his inherent power to do justice.' 3 °
Courts have also acted contrary to the holding in Dintz by pe-
nalizing the defendant for electing to proceed to verdict in the face of
prejudicial error. Courts have held that, by this election, the defend-
ant has "waived any privilege. . . to the remedy of retrial."'' The
express rationale of Dintz was that the defendant who requested a
mistrial had not "waived" a constitutional right but, instead, ordered
the priority of his double jeopardy interests, 132 relinquishing his in-
terest in the chosen jury to relieve himself of the burdens and ex-
penses of a trial in which he had no interest. The necessary corollary
to that holding is that the defendant who opts to hear the verdict of
the first jury despite prejudicial error cannot be penalized for that
election. If the error was not remedied by curative measures at trial,
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted.
V. Dismissals and Acquittals Prior to Verdict
A. The Jenkins Rule
A fundamental rule of double jeopardy jurisprudence is that a
verdict of acquittal, no matter how erroneous, bars a second trial of
the defendant. 13 3 No exceptions are made because the defendant has
a favorable, final judgment on the merits and the second trial would
violate the important policy against multiple prosecutions. Thus, the
public interest is conclusively presumed to be outweighed by the de-
fendant's interests.
134
129. Cf. United States v. Beasely, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924
(1973) (retrial held proper in part because State had produced the same evidence and witnesses
in second trial as it had in first).
130. See United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 911
(1969), rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 874 (1970); Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 538.
131. United States v. Mussehl, 453 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.N.D. 1978). In Mussehl several
errors prejudicial to the defendant would have justified a sua sponte mistrial declaration. Af-
ter each error, however, defense counsel requested either dismissal of the charges under the
judge's inherent power to do justice, or continuation of the trial. The defendant was convicted
and renewed his motion for dismissal of the charges. Not only was the dismissal denied, but
the court also held that the defendant had forfeited his privilege to the remedy of a retrial. Id
at 1239.
132. See notes 123-25 and accompanying text supra.
133. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
134. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978).
An issue of paramount importance in applying that fundamen-
tal principle is the definition of "acquittal."' 35 In 1975 the Supreme
Court faced that difficult issue in the context of a bench trial in
United States v. Jenkins.'36 In Jenkins the trial court had dismissed
the charges against the defendant. On review the Supreme Court
was unsure whether the trial judge, acting as the fact finder, had dis-
missed the prosecution "on the determination of facts in favor of
[the] defendant or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to
him."'1 3 7 Without deciding whether the judge's action was an "ac-
quittal" the Court examined the multiple prosecution aspect of the
double jeopardy clause and concluded that anytime a remand would
require "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution
of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged," no
appeal would lie.' 38 The Jenkins rule effectively prohibited appeal
after any midtrial termination other than a mistrial,139 which caused
some appellate courts to be dissatisfied with the rule. 4 °
B. The Scott Rule
1. Jenkins Overruled-The Court's "vastly increased exposure
to the various facets of the Double Jeopardy Clause"' 1 led it to
135. The term "acquittal" is generally defined as a ruling on the merits discharging the
defendant from prosecution. See United States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir.
1973). For a discussion of other definitions that have been advanced, see Note, Government
Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal Cases, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1835-41 (1974).
136. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Jenkins. None
of the Justices dissented from the judgment.
137. 420 U.S. at 366-67.
138. Id at 370. The Court's analysis in Jenkins turned on whether the proceeding had
"terminated in the defendant's favor," rather than whether he had been acquitted. United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 n.9 (1978). The Jenkins Court ignored the res judicata (on the
issue of guilt) aspect of the double jeopardy clause and made the defendant's interest in under-
going one prosecution an absolute. Generally, no interest has been considered an absolute in
double jeopardy law. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 505 (1978). See notes 26, 27 and
accompanying text supra, notes 156-57 and accompanying text infra.
139. Actually, the Court's decision did not change the existing case law because, prior to
1970, the Criminal Appeals Act did not permit Government appeals of dismissals granted after
the attachment of jeopardy. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, as amended by Act
of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. VIII, § 1301, 82 Stat. 237 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1976)). The purpose of the 1970 amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), however, was to
expand the scope of review. See note 153 and accompanying text infra.
140. In United States v. Appawoo, 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977), for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit permitted retrial of a defendant who had been
granted a dismissal by the trial judge because of the unconsitutionality of the charging statute,
after jeopardy had attached. Finding evidence that the trial judge had purposely delayed his
ruling to preclude appeal, id at 1246, the court reversed the judge's erroneous conclusion of
law and remanded for a new trial without even mentioning Jenkins. The court relied on a
1977 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
Martin Linen did not overrule Jenkins, but it defined an acquittal as "a resolution, correct or
not, of some or all of the elements of the offense charged." Id at 571. This definition was
seized upon by five justices in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), in overruling Jenkins.
See note 162 and accompanying text infra.
141. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
reexamine Jenkins three years after it was decided, in United States
v. Scott.'42 John Scott was charged with distribution of narcotics in
a three-count indictment. After jeopardy had attached the trial court
granted his request for dismissal for preindictment delay. 143 The
judge's ruling was clearly within the scope of the Jenkins rule and
the circuit court of appeals dismissed the appeal on that basis.
44
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari, reversed the appel-
late court, and expressly overruled Jenkins. 45 In the Court's estima-
tion Jenkins "placed an unwarrantedly great emphasis on the
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury impaneled
to try him so as to include those cases where the defendant himself
seeks to terminate the trial before verdict on grounds unrelated to
factual guilt or innocence."' ' 6
The Court demonstrated that the Jenkins rule, though easily ap-
plied, did not adequately protect the public interest involved. When
the defendant persuades the trial judge to terminate the trial without
an adjudication on the merits of his guilt or innocence, the defendant
has not been deprived of his interest in a chosen jury. 147 The public,
on the other hand, has been deprived of its "valued right to one com-
plete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws," 48 and
therefore, retrial is justified.
Clearly, the legislative histories of statutes enabling government
appeal provide justification for the Scott Court's carving out an ex-
ception to the Jenkins rule. The Court premised the Scott decision
on its definition of "acquittal" as "a resolution. . . correct or not, of
some or all of the elements of the offense charged."' 49 Although the
original Criminal Appeals Act 5 ' and the pre-1970 amendments
never permitted government appeal after jeopardy had attached, a
dismissal prior to attachment, a "special plea in bar," was appealable
142. Id Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in a 5-4 decision.
143. Scott had raised his claim before thre trial had begun, but the judge properly delayed
ruling on the claim until trial of the case to measure actual prejudice to the defendant. See 437
U.S. at IIl (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
145. 437 U.S. at 84.
146. Id at 837. See note 138 supra.
147. Id at 100.
148. Id The dissenters contended that the Government had a "complete opportunity" to
try the defendant "by virtue of its participation as an adversay at the criminal trial." 437 U.S.
at 109 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Their theory-one shot at conviction-has been labeled a
"sporting" theory of justice, see Note, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" in Criminal Cases,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1837 (1974), and it places too high a premium on judicial perfection.
149. 437 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977)).
150. The Government first gained a right of appeal by the 1907 Criminal Appeals Act.
Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)).
Even with its pre-1970 amendments, however, the Act was labeled "an unruly child that has
not improved with age." United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970) (opinion of Harlan,
J.). Its common-law technicalities prevented meaningful analysis of the double jeopardy
clause. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 85 (1978).
and was distinguished from a dismissal going to the general issue of
guilt or innocence, which was not appealable.' 5' Further historical
support for differentiating acquittals from dismissals is found in the
legislative history of the current version of the Criminal Appeals
Act.' 52 The report from the Senate Judiciary Committee indicates
that Congress, by passing the 1970 amendment, intended to permit
government appeals from any post-attachment midtrial terminations
other than a "true acquittal"--one "based upon the insufficiency of
the evidence to prove an element of the offense."' 53 Moreover, a
letter from the Solicitor General, which was presented by the Senate
floor speaker introducing the 1970 amendment, supports not only the
distinction that was made by the Scott Court, but also the Court's
rationale for the distinction. The Solicitor General described the in-
adequacy of the prior acts thus:
[T]he present law prohibits an appeal by the Government from a
wide range of adverse determinations. . even though the court's
ruling has nothing to do with the factual issues in the case, and
even though the ruling terminating the trial is entered at the de-
fendant's request so that a government appeal would in no way
affect the defendant's right not to be placed in double jeopardy, or
his right to proceed to verdict before the original jury. 154
2. Scott and Double Jeopardy Interest Analysis. -More impor-
tant than the historical justification for Scott is the achievement by
the Court of the proper accommodation of the competing double
jeopardy interests. Since the public interest in a fair trial to convict
the accused remains constant throughout the criminal proceeding,
the defendant's interests, as they are variously implicated at different
stages of the trial, control the outcome in any double jeopardy case
analysis.'55 Anytime the trial does not culminate in a verdict, the
defendant's interest in undergoing one prosecution for the same of-
fense will be violated upon retrial. But that interest standing alone
does not automatically bar a second trial, for if it did, retrial would
never be permitted after a mistrial5 6 or after an erroneous convic-
tion. 157 Instead, the defendant's interest in avoiding successive pros-
151. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 312 (1971).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). In its first encounter with the 1970 amendment, the Court
gave effect to the perceived congressional intent "to remove all statutory barriers to Govern-
ment appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975).
153. S. REP. No. 91-1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 11 (1970).
154. 116 CONG. REC. 35659 (1970) (letter from Office of the Solicitor General, presented
by Sen. Hurska) (emphasis added).
155. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 477-78 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
generally Comment, Double Jeopardy, supra note 28, at 336-50.
156. Retrial after a mistrial declared for manifest necessity is clearly permissible. See
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
157. It is a fundamental principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence that the defendant
who successfully appeals a conviction can be retried without violation of the double jeopardy
clause. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978). But see Burks v. United States, 437
ecution must be combined with his interest in a final judgment on
the merits--4he res judicata function of the double jeopardy
clause' 5 -before the public's interest is conclusively presumed to be
outweighed. ' 59
The Scott Court simply recognized that there is no res judicata
on the merits of the case when the defendant convinces the trial
judge to terminate the proceedings on a legal or constitutional claim
unrelated to the factual elements of the offense charged. Having
elected to avoid the verdict of the first jury sworn to resolve the fac-
tual issues, the defendant who is granted an erroneous "legal" dis-
missal has a weaker claim for avoiding an adjudication on the merits
in a second proceeding than does the defendant who has had a mis-
trial declared by the court over his objection. Moreover, the Scott
decision advances the important public interest without requiring the
defendant to forego any constitutional right. Any claim within the
scope of the Scott holding is as easily ruled on either before jeopardy
attaches or after the verdict is rendered as during the trial itself. 60
3. The Scope of Scott. -Historical and theoretical justifica-
tions will be of little consequence if Scott is "incapable of principled
application," as the Scott dissenters contended.' 6' Examination of
the Court's definitions of "acquittal" and "dismissal" should begin
the inquiry into the validity of the dissenters' assertions. The Court
held that an acquittal occurs only when "the ruling of the judge,
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's
favor], correct or not, of some or all of the elements of the factual
offense charged."' 162 A dismissal, on the other hand, "represent a
legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may
not be punished because of a supposed constitutional violation."'
' 63
(a). The strictly legal defenses. -In Serfass v. United States, 
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decided in 1975, the Court held that a defendant whose case was
erroneously dismissed on constitutional grounds prior to the attach-
ment of jeopardy could be retried. The Court, however, did not "in-
timate any view concerning the case .. .of 'a defendant who is
U.S. 1 (1978) (appellate reversal for insufficiency of evidence to convict (acquittal) precludes
retrial).
158. See notes 9, 10 and accompanying text supra.
159. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 505 (1978).
160. Preindictment delay cannot usually be ruled on before trial, but the Scott Court ex-
pressly approved of the trial judge's waiting until after the verdict to rule on the defendant's
claim. By delaying his ruling, he preserves difficult questions of law for judicial review and
upholds the defendant's interest in avoiding a second prosecution. See United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 100 n.13 (1978).
161. Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 97 (1978).
163. Id at 98 n.Il and accompanying text.
164. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense
prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed
in jeopardy before raising the defense.' "165 Some examples of these
Serfass legal defenses include the following: (1) whether an indict-
ment states an offense; (2) whether conduct set forth in the indict-
ment violates the statute; and (3) whether the statute is
constitutional.' 66 None of these defenses could serve as the basis for
an acquittal under Scott because they are all capable of resolution
without resort to the facts of the case.'6 7 Hence, any termination
sustaining one of the Serfass defenses is appealable.
(b). Legal-factual defenses.-The distinction between dismis-
sals and acquittals is less easily perceived when the termination re-
sults from the trial judge's ruling of law as applied to the facts in the
case. The defenses of insanity, entrapment, preindictment delay,
and denial of a speedy trial are a few legal-factual defenses. Under
the Scott formulation, some of these defenses will provide grounds
for an acquittal, but others will not.
The distinction is made between those legal-factual defenses es-
tablishing lack of culpability and those establishing legal immunity
from punishment. The defenses of insanity and entrapment provide
"legally adequate justification for otherwise criminal acts. . . neces-
sarly [establishing] the criminal defendant's lack of criminal culpa-
bility."' 68 For this reason the Scott Court expressly stated that the
trial judge's decision to terminate a trial on the grounds that the
prosecutor has introduced insufficient evidence to rebut either of
these defenses is unappealable.169 A dismissal for preindictment de-
lay, on the other hand, does not go to the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's evidence, but rather, represents a "legal judgment that a
defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished be-
cause of a supposed constitutional violation."' 7 ° Since a finding of
preindictment delay releases the defendant irrespective of guilt or
innocence, the Scott Court expressly held that a dismissal on this
basis is appealable.'
Although the Scott Court did not mention other legal-factual
165. Id at 394.
166. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 77 (1978).
167. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) permits the defendant to raise any defense that "is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue." Certain of these defenses must be raised
pretrial or they are considered to be waived. Id
168. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1978). See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
169. 437 U.S. at 97-98.
170. Id at 98. To establish his claim of preindictment delay, a defendant must prove
prejudice to his defense resulting from unjustified governmental delay in bringing the indict-
ment. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).
171. 437 U.S. at 99.
defenses, each is easily categorized as grounds for either an acquittal
or a dismissal. A speedy trial defense is very similar to the defense
of preindictment delay'72 and clearly could not sustain an acquittal.
Since the running of the statute of limitations frees both the culpable
and the nonculpable,' 73 the trial judge's midtrial termination based
on a statute of limitations defense should also be appealable. An
example of a legal-factual defense, not mentioned in Scott, that
should be unappealable is lack of specific intent to commit the crime
because of the defendant's belief at the time of the act that the un-
derlying statute was unconstitutional.' 74 This defense must be dis-
tinguished from the strictly legal defense that the statute is
unconstitutional.175 A favorable ruling on the former is a ruling on
one of the factual elements of any crime-intent. A favorable ruling
on the latter, on the other hand, does not go to culpability or insuffi-
ciency of the evidence but, rather, indicates that the defendant,
though criminally culpable, cannot be convicted.
It is evident that Scott does not permit the kind of bright-line
analysis that made the Jenkins rule so tenable. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction Scott makes between acquittals and dismissals is capable of
uniform and principled application by the appellate courts.
VI. Conclusion
To insure that the innocent defendant is not convicted along
with the guilty, the double jeopardy clause sets limits on the state in
its attempt to convict the accused. If it is interpreted to impose insu-
perable obstacles in the path of the fair administration of justice,
however, the double jeopardy clause will become a sword wielded by
the guilty defendant. The Washington, Dintz, and Scott decisions
properly accommodate the defendant's double jeopardy interests
with the countervailing public interest in convicting the guilty.
In the mistrial setting, the Washington decision sounds a clear
mandate to trial judges to declare mistrial if it is necessary to uphold
the integrity of the criminal proceedings, "to take prompt and affirm-
ative action to stop ... professional misconduct"' 76 when it is
found. When there is danger of prosecutorial manipulation in the
situation, however, the judge is instructed not to foreclose the de-
fendant's option to go to the first jury without his consent. Dintz, on
the other hand, makes abundantly clear that the defendant's request
for a mistrial will, in most cases, remove any barriers to a second
172. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
173. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 312, 322-23 (1971).
174. See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 362-63 n.3 (1975).
175. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
176. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978).
trial. The defendant is to be given primary control of the proceed-
ings in the event of prejudicial error. He alone is to order the prior-
ity of his interests.
Scott also advances the public interest in a fair trial of the ac-
cused without enhancing the probability that the innocent will be
convicted along with the guilty. The defendant is not required to
give up any other constitutional right to secure his double jeopardy
protection. Absent an actual violation of the defendant's legal or
constitutional rights, however, he is required to convince one
factfinder of his innocence of the alleged offense. Immunity from
prosecution is an extreme remedy for judicial error. The Scott Court
properly recognized that such an extreme remedy is unwarranted
when that judicial error is induced by the defendant and deprives the
public of its fair day in court.
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